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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the political and security implications of China’s economic 
expansion into the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. It employs a comparative 
case study method to assess the PRC’s relations with three Arab states: Saudi Arabia, 
which is a major source of China’s petroleum imports; Egypt, which is a significant 
destination for Chinese infrastructure development resources and a participant in China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and Jordan, which has relatively weak economic ties with 
the PRC. This research broadly encompasses the period between 1993, the year of 
China’s emergence in the MENA region as a net energy importer, and the present. 
Ultimately, this thesis finds that China’s increasing levels of regional economic 
engagement are linked with political responses from certain Arab governments. China’s 
economic activities have not induced a shift in partner states’ voting behavior as it 
specifically relates to human rights in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It 
has, however, influenced the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments to respond 
domestically and internationally to China’s Uyghur situation in ways that align with 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests. It is also correlated with the weakening of the 
political and security partnership between Egypt and the United States. As such, this 
analysis suggests that China’s regional economic engagement may be having effects on 
the broader international order. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2017, Air Force One landed in Riyadh and Donald Trump set foot in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the first time as president of the United States. Red carpets 
were rolled out, brass bands played, and seemingly no expense was spared to impress the 
leader of a country that Saudi leaders viewed as a key ally and partner. In many ways this 
state visit mirrored a different one from the previous year. Red carpets had been trod upon 
and lofty cooperation deals had been inked, but that time, instead of translating into 
English, Saudi leaders had listened approvingly as their speeches were interpreted into 
Chinese for a very different guest: Chinese president Xi Jinping.1 
To date, a growing Chinese presence in the Middle East has been noticeable as the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks to secure energy resources, but there has been 
uncertainty within the scholarly and policymaking communities regarding China’s regional 
and global intentions and the consequences of an increased Chinese presence. In this light, 
this thesis seeks to answer the following question: What are the political and diplomatic 
ramifications of China’s drive to ensure access to energy resources and expand its 
economic involvement in the Middle East? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), released in 2017, makes 
clear the concerns of American leaders and policymakers about perceived Chinese 
revisionism within the international order.2  Indeed, China’s presence around the world in 
various venues has increased consonant with its rapid economic rise. As its economy has 
ascended to a position that is second only to that of the United States,3 China’s presence 
 
1 “Xi Visits Saudi Arabia to Improve Ties,” BBC News, January 19, 2016, sec. Middle East, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35351391. 
2 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, 
2017). 
3 Prableen Bajpai, “The 5 Largest Economies in The World and Their Growth In 2020,” NASDAQ, 
accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/the-5-largest-economies-in-the-world-and-their-
growth-in-2020-2020-01-22. 
2 
and influence has become increasingly visible on a truly global scale. This, along with the 
obscurity that results from a marked sense of vagueness from Chinese leaders regarding 
their intentions,4 has led to much study, speculation, and concern in the highest levels of 
the scholarly, government, and military communities. The United States must better 
understand the effects of China’s activities on other countries’ political decision-making if 
the U.S., in accordance with its NSS, desires to “strengthen partnerships.”5 
To date, though, there has been a mixed reaction within the scholarly community 
regarding the strategic reasoning behind and effects of Chinese initiatives in the Middle 
East. The United States continues to operate in a fashion that prioritizes a focus on “Great 
Power Competition” (GPC) in the Indo-Pacific region, but there has been a lack of analysis 
of the influence of its great power competitors in the Middle East and how that affects the 
domestic and international standing of those great powers and the decision-making within 
regional capitals. It is in this light that this thesis seeks to contribute to the subject literature 
and assist in narrowing a gap in research. The United States’ focus on the Middle East has 
historically been oriented around subjects such as domestic energy security and limiting 
the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism. The research that does exist related to 
foreign influence in the region primarily concerns itself with Soviet/Russian influence.6  
Chinese activities in this region merit a deeper analysis, for they are by no means 
inconspicuous. In 2017, China became the world’s largest oil importer, with roughly half 
of imported resources coming from the Middle East.7 Additionally, the Middle Kingdom 
is the largest foreign direct investor in terms of outward flow (the amount of foreign direct 
invest [FDI] going from China to the Middle East)8 in the region, with over 80% of its 
 
4 Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the Malacca Dilemma,” Asian Security 4, no. 2 
(2008): 153. 
5 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, 49. 
6 Steve A. Yetiv and Katerina Oskarsson, Challenged Hegemony: The United States, China, and 
Russia in the Persian Gulf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018), 6. 
7 Henrik Stalhane Hiim and Stig Stenslie, “China’s Realism in the Middle East,” Survival 61, no. 6 
(2019): 155. 
8 “Glossary: Foreign Direct Investment,” SelectUSA, accessed June 8, 2020, 
https://www.selectusa.gov/fdi-data-glossary. 
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investments going into the energy sector.9 Viewed alongside China’s recent push to 
integrate the Middle East into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure plans10 and 
placed in the context of China’s rise as a global power, these dynamics can by no means 
be viewed as insignificant, for they augur a continued strengthening of Chinese-Middle 
Eastern ties. The potential effects on states that the U.S. maintains strong relations with in 
the region (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates)11 
may ultimately have negative implications on U.S. policy. 
A deeper integration of regional analyses and understandings can only be beneficial 
to policymakers and scholars alike. In an era marked by a renewed focus on GPC, greater 
attention must be given to analyzing the effects of Chinese presence in a region where the 
United States has historically maintained preeminence and that is crucial to global 
economic stability. From an academic perspective, this thesis adds to the relatively small 
but growing body of literature that analyzes China’s economic activities in the Middle East 
and political reactions by Middle Eastern governments. In a broader sense, it will increase 
scholarly knowledge by more deeply analyzing an aspect of China’s potential influence 
and its degree of appeal around the world. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In general, the existing literature concerning Chinese economic, military, and 
diplomatic activity in the Middle East can be placed into three categories. These are broadly 
defined as, first, studies that focus on China’s motivations for increasing its involvement 
in the Middle East; second, studies that assess China’s strategy and activities in the region; 
and, third, studies that examine the consequences of these activities. Some studies cover 
multiple topics. 
 
9 Hiim and Stenslie, “China’s Realism in the Middle East,” 156. 
10 Xuming Qian and Jonathan Fulton, “China-Gulf Economic Relationship under the ‘Belt and Road’ 
Initiative,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 12–21, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023306. 
11 William F. Wechsler, “US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality,” in The 
MENA Region: A Great Power Competition, ed. Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (ISPI and Atlantic 
Council, 2019), 13–38, https://atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MENA-Region-Great-
Power-Competition-Report-Web-2.pdf. 
4 
1. China’s Motivations 
In terms of motivations behind the building of Sino-Middle Eastern ties, many, if 
not most, scholars attribute China’s increasing engagement in the region to the state’s need 
to secure access to foreign oil resources. These scholars have observed an increasing 
appetite for petroleum resources in China,12 a dynamic that the group links to the rapid 
growth that has characterized the Chinese economy over the past three decades and static 
levels of domestic oil production in China.13 The resulting branch of scholarship generally 
emphasizes the role of domestic motivators in Chinese foreign policy.14 Leung represents 
this trend in his analysis, noting that energy security “underpins the core objectives of 
Beijing and the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China.”15 In this 
assessment, maintaining access to oil resources is less about public prosperity than it is the 
survival of the ruling regime; as such, the government, in addition to promoting initiatives 
that make China more energy-efficient, is motivated to become more involved 
internationally to secure access to petroleum.16 The desire to maintain social stability and 
strengthen survivability of the ruling party encourages the Chinese government to become 
more actively involved in certain strategically important regions.17 Other scholars 
emphasize this point even more emphatically, with Olimat asserting that the Middle East 
and the energy resources that the region contains are necessary and essential to any 
continued Chinese growth.18  
 
12 Andrew Scobell et al., At the Dawn of Belt and Road: China in the Developing World (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 151, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2273. 
13 For an example, see Erica Strecker Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security (Arlington, VA: 
RAND Corporation, 2006). 
14 Hiim and Stenslie, 156. 
15 Guy C.K. Leung, “China’s Energy Security: Perception and Reality,” Energy Policy 39, no. 3 
(March 2011): 1330. 
16 Leung, 1337. 
17 Mordechai Chaziza, China’s New Silk Road Strategy and the Middle East (Tel Aviv: The Begin-
Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2020), 1-4. 
18 Muhamad S. Olimat, China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 2. 
5 
To ensure access to foreign energy resources, states require the safe and uninhibited 
passage of these goods through maritime trade routes and the maintenance of stable sea 
lines of communication. With regards to China, scholars have noted the existence of a 
“Malacca Dilemma,” which refers to China’s dependence on energy resources that transit 
the Strait of Malacca chokepoint and the risk that foreign powers will blockade this 
maritime route in the future.19 Lind and Press argue that China’s economic actions are a 
response to perceived vulnerability in the form of potential outside interference and energy 
market volatility.20 Similarly, Downs asserts that China’s economic initiatives are 
primarily part of a defensive response to a strategic vulnerability21 
Scholars have also observed a number of potential motives for China’s activities in 
the Middle East that are unrelated to its drive to secure energy resources. One of these 
involves economic concerns that are less focused on energy. According to scholars in this 
camp, China is motivated by a desire to enhance trade relations with the Middle East.22 
This dynamic is influenced by a recognition amongst China’s leaders of the need for new 
markets to absorb increasing amounts of Chinese exports.23 Because many Middle Eastern 
countries represent opportunities to further fuel China’s economic growth, China’s leaders 
are increasingly motivated to become involved in the region. 
China’s status as a great power within the contemporary international order has also 
been a subject of analysis. According to Shambaugh, China is motivated to invest and 
become involved in various regions around the world primarily to improve its global image 
and international appeal.24 Much attention is also given to China’s intentions and/or 
 
19 Lanteigne, 143–44. 
20 Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press, “Markets or Mercantilism?: How China Secures Its Energy 
Supplies,” International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 170–204. 
21 Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security. 
22 Olimat, 56. 
23 James Chen, “The Emergence of China in the Middle East,” Strategic Forum 271 (December 2011): 
1, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555783.pdf. 
24 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 4 
(August 2015): 99–107. 
6 
abilities to affect the hegemonic regional role of the U.S.25 Hiim and Stenslie assert that 
China is motivated to expand its economic influence in the region in response to an 
American role that is perceived to be declining and the resulting power vacuum.26 
Wechsler’s analysis fits this trend, noting that the perception of U.S. withdrawal from the 
region is developing into a self-fulfilling prophecy that undergirds deepening Chinese 
involvement and investment.27 Alterman also observes that China is motivated to become 
the primary source of economic development in the region. This motivation is notable, 
though, for its awareness of American vulnerabilities and lack of desire to clash with 
American interests.28  In sum, China may be motivated to take a larger role in the region 
because of a perceived reduction in American presence and commitment. Even if it is not, 
China is still cognizant of the balance of power between foreign states in the region, which 
factors into Chinese motivations. 
2. China’s Activities in the Middle East  
The second prominent strand of research examines China’s repertoire of activities 
in the Middle East. Lind and Press analyze China’s activities through the lens of energy 
mercantilism, observing that China’s activities in the region to secure access to energy have 
included an active push to cultivate deeper ties and relationships with energy-exporting 
countries.29 This is similar to the position taken by Fulton, Sun, and Al-Tamimi, who assert 
that China’s initial interest in energy is pulling it into even deeper engagement with the 
region on multiple levels.30 This theme includes a focus on Chinese infrastructure 
 
25 James M. Dorsey, “China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom,” Asian Journal of 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/
25765949.2017.12023322; White House, National Security Strategy of the United States. 
26 Hiim and Stenslie, 153. 
27 Wechsler, 38. 
28 Jon B. Alterman, “China, the United States, and the Middle East,” in The Red Star & the Crescent: 
China and the Middle East, ed. James Reardon-Anderson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 37–
58. 
29 Lind and Press, 170–1. 
30 Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, and Naser Al-Tamimi, China’s Great Game in the Middle East, ed. 
Camille Lons (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/china_great_game_middle_east.pdf. 
7 
development, trade, and soft power, especially as it relates to assessments of China’s 
BRI.31 Kamel observes that China is specifically using expanded engagement associated 
with the BRI  in the Middle East to lock in access to energy.32 Zhang emphasizes the utility 
of China’s “going out” policy, which aims to build bilateral ties with other Middle Eastern 
nations in order to gain access for its national oil companies (NOCs) and ensure access to 
energy.33  Likewise, Salman and Geeraerts note a positive association between the growing 
amount of oil that China imports from the Middle East and the increasing levels of Sino-
Middle Eastern trade. The authors argue that building trade ties to ensure access to vital 
resources is an integral element of China’s “strategic hedging” regional strategy, which 
describes how a state rising in prominence can indirectly compete with a reining hegemonic 
power (i.e., the U.S.).34  
Some scholars also examine China’s growing activities outside of the economic 
realm. Yetiv and Lu emphasize not only China’s regional economic presence, but also its 
expanding diplomatic and military arms sales efforts.35 Gentry applies this logic in his case 
study of Sino-Iranian relations, arguing that China’s oil-fueled interest in the Islamic 
Republic is related to its apparent arming of Iran and delivery of assistance in the nuclear 
realm.36 Ji goes further with his prediction that China will ameliorate its perceived  regional 
vulnerabilities through hard, military means.37 From a wider perspective, Lanteigne asserts 
 
31 Peter Ferdinand, “Westward Ho-The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign 
Policy under Xi Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 941–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2346.12660; Qian and Fulton, “China-Gulf Economic Relationship under the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative.” 
32 Maha S. Kamel, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East,” Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 76–95, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09557571.2018.1480592. 
33 ZhongXiang Zhang, “China’s Energy Security, the Malacca Dilemma and Responses,” Energy 
Policy 39, no. 12 (December 2011): 7614, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.033. 
34 Mohammad Salman and Gustaaf Geeraerts, “Strategic Hedging and China’s Economic Policy in the 
Middle East,” China Report 51, no. 2 (2015): 104. 
35 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, “China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,” Middle East 
Journal 61, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 199–218. 
36 J. Brandon Gentry, “The Dragon and the Magi: Burgeoning Sino–Iranian Relations in the 21st 
Century,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3, no. 3 (2005): 111–12. 
37 You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply,” Strategic 
Analysis 31, no. 3 (May 2007): 467–89. 
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that China will possibly apply multilateral diplomatic approaches to maintain stability in 
and ensure access to the region.38 This is a dynamic that has also been noted in key Chinese 
policy documents,39 although it stands in contrast to the public rhetoric of China’s 
leadership. From this standpoint, China’s most significant activities in the Middle East are 
those that involve more than the oft-cited subjects of oil and trade. 
3. Consequences of China’s Activities in the Middle East 
The third prominent strand of research emphasizes the effects that China’s activities 
have had on the Middle East. Economy and Levi assert that China’s drive to secure energy 
and other necessary natural resources is transforming the regional order in the Middle East 
and may have significant effects on the international order.40 They conclude, though, that 
the moderating forces of globalization and economic interdependence can help to ensure 
that China’s resource quest is ultimately benign.41 Ziegler is even more sanguine, asserting 
that such forces have promoted international cooperation and will continue to do so in the 
future.42 Yetiv and Oskarsson argue that the balance in the region will remain unchanged, 
as China benefits the most by being a free-rider in the current system defined by American 
influence.43 
Conversely, Kurlantzick argues that China is actively using its soft power appeal to 
alter the regional order in the Middle East to match its preference of being viewed as the 
most powerful actor in the region.44 Kamel likewise argues that China is using the appeal 
created by its BRI activities to reshape the existing regional and global orders and maintain 
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its ascendance.45 Garver notes that China has a growing ability to engage in diplomacy and 
affect regional events, as evidenced by its participation in the Iran nuclear negotiations 
between 2012 and 2015.46 In his analysis, Wechsler asserts that the combination of 
deepening Chinese involvement and increasing American disengagement in the region can 
specifically result in the weakening of ties between the U.S. and its regional partners (the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi, Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt).47 With that 
being said, it should be noted that commentary concerning the ultimate effects resulting 
from the increase in Sino-Middle Eastern activity in spheres outside of those related to oil 
and trade tend to be more based more on predictions and assertions than observations of 
current circumstances. Additionally, few scholars focus primarily on the effects of Sino-
Middle Eastern arms sales, security cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives.  
A final element of this strand of literature examines the reactions of Middle Eastern 
governments to increased Chinese economic involvement in the region. It should be noted 
that this component of the literature is fairly small, especially in comparison to the others 
mentioned previously. This group of scholars generally finds that increased Chinese 
demand, especially for oil, creates a willingness among Middle Eastern governments to 
actively seek out stronger ties with the PRC.48 Overall, increasing Chinese involvement 
has resulted in a growing perception among these Middle Eastern states that China’s power 
in the region can counterbalance that of the U.S. This dynamic is further strengthened by 
these states’ belief that there are fewer political “strings,” including calls for governance 
reforms, attached to transactions with China compared to those with the U.S.49  
Some scholars have also observed that Middle Eastern governments demonstrate a 
propensity to make political compromises to ensure future economic dealings with 
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China.50 There are very few specific examples of this dynamic in the literature. One of the 
few is the collective response (or lack thereof) of Middle Eastern governments to the 
Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghurs, a mostly Muslim Turkic population native 
to western China. Friedrichs et al. note a relationship between economic interest and a lack 
of willingness of foreign governments to speak out about this apparent human rights 
violation.51 However, they fail to support this thesis with qualitative evidence. Dorsey 
continues this trend with a slightly more assertive analysis, arguing that Middle Eastern 
governments will remain silent on issues such as these out of economic interest.52  
In general, assessments of Middle Eastern governments’ reactions to China’s 
activities comprise the least-studied branch of scholarship in this area. As such, a 
significant gap exists in the English-language literature linking collective Middle Eastern 
political behavior with Chinese economic activity. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
According to the arguments presented in the literature, there are a number of 
potential ways in which Chinese economic activity affects Middle Eastern political 
behavior. This thesis evaluates the following hypothesis: 
H1: China’s regional economic activities are causing Middle Eastern 
countries to support its political positions  
As some scholars have noted, China’s economic entrance into the Middle East has 
been accompanied with an appeal that can potentially affect political outcomes and the 
regional order.53 If this hypothesis is valid, one would expect to find evidence of Middle 
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Eastern countries changing their behavior in China’s preferred direction in response to 
rising Chinese engagement.  
Absence of such evidence will suggest the null hypothesis:  
H0: China’s regional activities are not causing Middle Eastern countries to 
support its political positions. 
I will evaluate the validity of my main hypothesis by assessing three separate 
indicators of Chinese influence: first, the trends in responses by each state to China’s 
human rights–related activities in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); second, 
the response by each state to China’s treatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority group; and 
third, the actions taken by each state to either strengthen or weaken its partnership with the 
U.S.  
These indicators were selected based on their relevance to China’s interests and 
their impacts on the contemporary international order. In terms of the United Nations (UN), 
China has been active in not only affirming those principles that it sees as vital to its own 
core interests (e.g., sovereignty), but also in using its influence to either prevent the 
introduction of and/or voting on resolutions that represent views inimical to those of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).54 Given the global nature of the UN and China’s 
assertiveness in international institutions like it,55 it would be logical for China to expand 
its network of potential constituent states to include those authoritarian regimes beyond 
those in its immediate regional neighborhood. 
The international reaction to China’s treatment of the Uyghur minority group 
represents another metric by which to measure changes in perceptions of China’s 
government on the international stage. Since the PRC’s annexation of Xinjiang in the late 
1880s, the region has become increasingly important to the CCP for reasons related to 
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energy and security.56 Tensions in the area have been steadily rising, though, as the Uyghur 
minority that inhabits the region seeks to maximize its autonomy from the central 
government in Beijing. The CCP’s actions to contain and control this group (which 
reportedly include mass incarcerations in prisons and concentration camps, forced 
sterilizations, the destruction of shrines and mosques, and other forms of cultural 
genocide57) have engendered criticism of the PRC on the international stage. This criticism 
has not been universal, however, and proposing explanations as to, first, why certain 
governments have varied in their responses, and, second, whether and how China 
effectuates instruments of national power to limit criticism remain topics of scholarly 
debate. As such, it is germane to assess the degree to which China’s external economic and 
political influence may supersede other factors of domestic political identity in this specific 
case. 
Lastly, as noted previously, a significant number of scholars have postulated that 
China is dissatisfied with its position in the contemporary liberal international order. If 
China truly seeks to immediately remake the global order, then it stands to reason that it 
would encourage, explicitly or implicitly, the weakening of partnerships between certain 
countries and the United States. Indeed, it would have an interest in “peeling off” American 
allies in order to elevate its own relative position in the region and world. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will use a comparative case study method to examine the effects of 
Chinese involvement on the political behavior of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan in the 
period between 1993 and the present. China transitioned from a net energy exporter to 
importer in 1993, which is also when its presence in the Middle East became pronounced.58 
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This period also encompasses China’s initiation of major infrastructure development plans 
around the world and in the Middle East, including the BRI; in this regard, there will be a 
particular focus on the period between 2013 (when BRI was first announced) and the 
present day. The analysis of this period will assess the effects of China’s engagement in 
the region in the form of changing political positions amongst Middle Eastern government 
on issues that concern China.  
The cases of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan were chosen in order to capture 
variation in how China engages with the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a major crude oil 
supplier for China, so the case captures China’s initiatives on countries that it relies on for 
petroleum. Egypt is one of the few regional powers to have officially signed onto China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative, so its case illuminates the effects of China’s infrastructure 
development initiatives. Jordan has relatively few energy or infrastructure development 
ties with China, so it represents a control case: a centralized, Sunni Arab-led state, with 
historically strong ties to the United States, which does not currently engage extensively 
with China. 
Each case study has a similar structure. I begin by describing China’s economic 
activities in the country. I then identify and analyze the actions that each country has taken 
in the United Nations in response to Chinese-led initiatives related to human rights;  the 
reactions, within each state, to China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority, as well as the 
actions that each has taken in the UN; and the trend in each country’s diplomatic and 
political relations with the United States in terms of the frequency of diplomatic visits and 
levels of arms sales, a commonly-recognized indicator of political influence.59  
The analysis of these relationships relies primarily on qualitative data collected 
from think-tank reports and UN voting records to analyze actions taken in the UN (i.e., 
how each country voted on specific resolutions sponsored by China). Potential difficulties 
do exist with this approach in that some individual votes are undertaken as formalities. 
However, this should be alleviated by analyses of voting patterns, rather than just of single 
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instances. My data sources also include scholarly books, news articles, think tank reports, 
and other secondary sources; these provide useful data such as public statements made by 
government, religious, and social leaders that reflect the domestic positions of each country 
on the subject issues (especially that which concerns the Uyghurs). Sources also include 
quantitative data from organizations such as the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) that measure the amounts of and trends in foreign military sales. Finally, 
this thesis uses economics datasets, such as those from the Observatory of Economic 
Complexity, the United Nations International Trade Statistics Database 
(UNCOMTRADE), and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), in order to assess the 
degree to which China is engaged with each country economically, both in terms of 
petroleum sales and infrastructure development.  
By using the collected qualitative and quantitative data to analyze the cases that 
involve Chinese energy and infrastructure investment (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and 
comparing the results with the control case (Jordan), I will be able to determine whether or 
not the aforementioned variables are factors in each country’s UN voting behavior, 
domestic reactions, and relationship with the U.S.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and 
highlights its significance. It addresses the relevant literature, lays out my main argument, 
and identifies other potential hypotheses. 
Chapters II, III, and IV, address the cases of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, 
respectively. Each chapter identifies China’s activities and degree of economic engagement 
in the subject country. It then analyzes the subject’s votes concerning Chinese-led human 
rights initiatives in the UN, responses to China’s treatment of the Uyghurs, and change in 
its political and security relationship with the U.S. Lastly, Chapter V summarizes the 
findings of my research, identifies implications for U.S. foreign policy, and recommends 
areas for future study. 
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II. CHINA AND SAUDI ARABIA 
 
China’s economic activities in the Middle East are by no means inconspicuous and 
are integrally tied to the Chinese government’s conceptions of stability and legitimacy. It 
is in Saudi Arabia in particular that China’s involvement is most apparent in terms of 
energy security. In short, the single most important factor underpinning China’s economic 
relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is China’s demand for petroleum resources 
to fuel and sustain its domestic economic growth. This dynamic, along with the Saudi 
Arabian regime’s inherent needs in maintaining its rentier state model, has contributed to 
building what is perhaps China’s most important relationship in the Middle East.60 With 
that being said, evidence suggests that, whether it is by design or impotence, China’s 
burgeoning economic might and the accompanying engagement to secure energy resources 
have not altered Saudi Arabia’s political behavior with regard to its voting in the UN or its 
relationship with the United States. It has, however, influenced the Saudi government’s 
response to the Uyghur situation. This evidence suggests, therefore, that China’s economic 
engagement with Saudi Arabia has produced limited levels of influence.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Understanding the history of the Sino-Saudi relationship and its basis in mutual 
economic benefits is fundamental to any conceptualization of the contemporary 
environment. In short, this relationship can best be characterized as episodic, but close. 
From the beginning of a period that stretches back centuries, this relationship has been 
centered on economic growth and the development of trade opportunities. The earliest 
contacts between China and the territory that is now Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the 
very beginnings of the Silk Road, the ancient system of trade networks that connected 
Europe and Asia.61 These trade-based links were later amplified by the voyages of Chinese 
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admiral Zheng He, the Muslim eunuch who is seen as the initiator China’s relationship 
with Saudi Arabia in the 15th century.62 These ties, though, did not prove to be enduring. 
It was not until 1949 that relations between the two countries became sustained, and even 
then, it was the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) that Saudi Arabia 
recognized. The Saudis continued that relationship for more than four decades, 
diplomatically shunning the PRC because of the fundamental ideological differences 
between conservative Islam and revolutionary Marxist-Leninism.63 
In 1990, the status quo shifted; Saudi Arabia broke relations with Taiwan and 
became one of the last major countries to recognize the PRC and initiate formal diplomatic 
relations with the mainland government in Beijing.64 While there are a number of factors 
that contributed to this decision, one of the most significant was China’s decision to sell its 
domestically produced DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to the Saudi kingdom in 
the 1988,65 a resource that the Saudis felt necessary for confronting the growing threat 
posed by the recently-reconstituted Islamic Republic of Iran. Up until that point, the Saudis 
had been prevented from acquiring such advanced weaponry from their chief partner, the 
U.S., due to Israeli opposition, mainly based on the fact that such missiles were capable of 
hitting targets throughout the region, including Israel. The transaction with China therefore 
allowed the Saudis to circumvent obstructions created by its primary great power patron 
and take steps to ensure its own security. Additionally, it allowed China to earn substantial 
financial compensation, and perhaps more importantly, expand its presence and influence 
the political decision-making in the capital of one of the United States’ main Middle 
Eastern partners.66 Thus, the terms of a relationship based on economic, political, and 
security quid pro quo were set. 
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B. CONTEMPORARY SINO–SAUDI ECONOMIC RELATIONS: OIL, 
TRADE, AND INVESTMENT 
In China, Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “opening up” the country to the outside 
world in the 1970s, along with other significant foreign and domestic policy reforms, 
contributed to rapid economic growth.67 This in turn led to a dramatic increase in China’s 
thirst for energy resources. By 1993, China’s demand for oil had outstripped its domestic 
production capacity and led to China’s entrance into the global economy as a net importer 
of oil (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Chinese Oil Consumption, Imports, and Domestic Production, 
1986–201868 
The increasing demand for petroleum naturally led to increased Chinese 
engagement with the Middle East, a region that is well-known for its oil wealth. Since 
1993, the Middle East has been the consistent source of more than 50 percent of China’s 
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imported petroleum resources.69 This demand is substantial; China’s imports of crude oil 
grew by more than 9 percent between 2013 and 2014 alone, which represented more than 
43 percent of global demand growth for that year.70 When one takes into account the fact 
that 2014 was marked by rather modest growth for the Chinese economy (gross domestic 
product [GDP] grew that year by “only” 8 percent instead of by double-digits, as in the 
years preceding it71), it becomes easy to see just how influential Chinese demand is on 
Middle Eastern and global oil markets in general. 
Saudi Arabia’s current prominence in the global and Chinese domestic energy 
markets lies in the fact that the Kingdom sits atop the largest proved petroleum reserves in 
the world. As of 2019, Saudi Arabia lays claim to an estimated 298 billion barrels, which 
represents more than 17% of the world’s total reserves.72 Additionally, Saudi Arabia is one 
of the world’s largest oil producers, generating more than 12 million barrels per day (BPD), 
or 12% of the global total in 2020.73 These figures (which are more than double those of 
the next-highest regional producer, Iraq74) define the Saudi kingdom as the largest 
petroleum producer in the Middle East and frame its geopolitical significance to interested 
great powers. 
In this sense, Saudi Arabia’s value to Chinese economic and political systems 
cannot be overstated. Indeed, in the competitive world that is the global petroleum market, 
Saudi Arabia currently sits in the prominent position of being China’s top oil supplier.75 It 
must further be appreciated that this relationship is not static; it has only deepened over 
recent decades, and is on pace to continue to do so (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Chinese Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1992–201876 
Even in the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic, China’s demand for and 
imports of oil and other petroleum-based resources have remained high; it imported its 
highest-ever total volume of crude in May 2020,77 and Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia 
alone nearly doubled those of the previous year, growing 95% to reach 2.16 million bpd.78 
Between 1993 and the present day, general Sino-Saudi economic ties, undergirded 
by the oil trade, have only strengthened. Saudi Arabia is China’s largest trading partner in 
the Middle East, and China is Saudi Arabia’s largest global trading partner.79 Petroleum is 
the basis for contemporary Sino-Saudi ties, but it is only one component of a larger 
relationship. 
 
76 Adapted from “Trade Data,” United Nations International Trade Statistics Database, accessed 
February 12, 2021, https://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
77 Charles Kennedy, “China’s Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia Jump to Record High,” OilPrice.com, 
accessed July 22, 2020, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Chinas-Oil-Imports-From-Saudi-
Arabia-Jump-To-Record-High.html. 
78 Muyu Xu and Chen Aizhu, “China’s Saudi Oil Imports Surge in May to All-Time High – Customs,” 
Reuters, June 25, 2020, https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL4N2DW0YB. 
79 Dongmei Chen and Wenke Han, Deepening Cooperation Between Saudi Arabia and China (Riyadh: 














































































As the Sino-Saudi trading relationship strengthens, it should be noted that it has 
become increasingly one-sided. Put simply, as time goes on, Saudi Arabia has become 
more dependent on China in terms of overall trade than China is Saudi Arabia. This 
becomes readily apparent when viewed through the lens of trade interdependence, a metric 
that refers to the share of a country’s international trade (imports and exports) that is 
conducted with a specific trading partner.80 The degree to which this share of trade changes 
between two countries can be seen as a general reflection of how important specific intra-
country trade is relative to total external trade dependence. As Figure 3 shows, the trade 
dependence of Saudi Arabia on China has gradually moved in a positive direction over 
time, whereas the levels of dependence of China on Saudi Arabia has remained relatively 
low, a result of China’s global trade diversification initiatives.81  
 
Figure 3. Trade Interdependence between China and Saudi Arabia, 2001–
201782 
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Indeed, while the most recent value of Saudi dependence on China stands at 7.4% 
(2018), which is lower than those seen throughout this past decade, it still represents a more 
than eight-fold increase from the 0.96% that it stood at in 1993. This shows that China is 
an extremely important trading partner for Saudi Arabia, whereas Saudi Arabia is relatively 
less important to China in terms of overall trade. 
The apparent imbalance of trade between China and Saudi Arabia is unsurprising 
when viewed through the lens of China’s global outlook. As some scholars have observed, 
“Asymmetry is the first and most enduring characteristic of [China’s] relations with 
developing countries.”83 As China’s economic and geopolitical power has grown, it has 
striven to create relationships and institutions to maximize its influence and agenda-setting 
power. Ensuring that other countries are more dependent on it for economic growth and 
political development is but one impactful method to accomplish this goal. 
Additionally, the aforementioned data suggest that China’s economic motivations 
for courting the Saudis do not reside in Saudi Arabia’s overall trade benefits to the Chinese 
economy as an export market. Rather, China’s interest in Saudi Arabia is primarily centered 
on a need to secure oil. China has developed a strong relationship with the kingdom to 
ensure the steady supply of this needed resource, a circumstance which in turn introduces 
a potential for China to cultivate its geopolitical clout in the region overall. 
1. Chinese Investment in Saudi Arabia 
Chinese economic initiatives have been furthered by Xi Jinping, the current 
president of the PRC. Since his ascension to leadership in 2012, China, as David 
Shambaugh notes, “has exhibited increased confidence and proactiveness on the world 
stage.”84 Xi and the current Chinese leadership have continued to build upon the 
foundations of Deng’s initiatives, going out even more actively and stressing the benefits 
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Chinese investment opportunities with partner nations.85 This dynamic marks 
contemporary relations with Saudi Arabia. An active China, in seeking to strengthen 
relations with the countries that provide it with the resources needed to ensure economic 
growth and preserve the rule of the CCP, has a strong interest in furthering engagement 
and investments with the Saudi kingdom. 
The Chinese oil industry is dominated by three major NOCs – the China National 
Petroleum Corporation, the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation.86 While these companies (which are among the 
largest in the world) are not directly run by the CCP, they are majority-owned by the 
government.87 As such, it is reasonable to presume that many of the ventures that they 
undertake are consonant with the strategic goals of the central government in Beijing. Their 
overseas investment and cooperation activities with Saudi entities are particularly 
noticeable. The Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company, a joint venture between Saudi 
Aramco, the Kingdom’s massive state-owned petroleum and natural gas company, and 
Sinopec was established in 2010 and it, alone, is able to process upwards of 400,000 BPD 
of Saudi heavy crude oil.88 In 2019, Sinopec and its subsidiaries have signed multiple deals 
with Saudi Aramco, including an $18 billion contract to boost the capacities of two of Saudi 
Arabia’s major oil fields.89 This move expands both the ability of Saudi Arabia to supply 
crude oil to markets and Chinese access to meet its growing demand. China is proactive 
and effective in partnering with foreign nations to address its own energy security 
requirements, a dynamic that results in concrete dividends for those partner nations.  
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One of the most notable instances of this dynamic was the attempt to put forward 
an international initial public offering (IPO) of a portion of Saudi Aramco. While this IPO 
ultimately turned out not to be international, it should be appreciated that, when it was 
originally planned to be, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) intended to invest 
between $5 and $10 billion.90 Even though these values represent only .25-.5% of the 
IPO’s target valuation, this was seen by many analysts as an attempt by Chinese officials 
to further endear themselves to the Saudi monarchy.91 This demonstrates that China’s 
involvement in Saudi Arabia’s economic development is deep, and regardless of the 
direction that the Saudi leadership chooses to take with regards to its energy resources and 
future economic diversification, China will more likely than not be heavily involved. 
2. Saudi Motivations and Chinese Oil Demand 
Saudi Arabia’s motive for selling oil to China and maintaining Chinese demand 
resides in the structure of the Saudi social contract. Put simply, because 87% the 
government’s income comes from the sale of petroleum and its derivatives,92 Saudi Arabia 
is a classic example of what many social scientists refer to as a rentier state.93 Rather than 
“earning” income by way of domestic taxation, the Saudi leadership relies on income 
earned from the sale of its natural resources to provide revenue and provide for the needs 
of its citizens. This, in turn, lessens civic involvement, staves off popular unrest, and 
preserves the regime’s stability.94 These stultifying effects have also been summed up as 
the resource curse,95 whereby “countries whose economies are heavily reliant on natural 
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resources tend to be…less democratic than those whose economies are not.”96 In effect, 
the Saudi leadership uses economic tools to maintain political power. These tools are 
dependent on the uninterrupted flow of revenue from foreign buyers and stable oil prices. 
Thus, just as China depends on a steady petroleum supply from Saudi Arabia to ensure the 
survival of its regime, Saudi depends on the preservation of Chinese petroleum demand for 
both its economic and political stability. 
It should be noted, though, that the current Saudi leadership, led by Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), appears to be aware of these challenges and 
vulnerabilities. This realization has motivated Saudi leadership to attempt to diversify the 
country’s economic base with the stated hope of eliminating Saudi Arabia’s dependence 
on oil by 2030. These initiatives are broadly grouped under the umbrella of Saudi Vision 
2030.97 To date, however, Saudi Arabia has been unable to escape the intractable forces of 
the resource curse. Instead, much of the new domestic investment and FDI inflows have 
been oriented towards oil-based petrochemicals and other energy-intensive industries,98 
which signals that the Saudi leadership has thus far been unable to create a nonoil sector 
that operates independently.  
a. Declining U.S. Demand  
All of the aforementioned dynamics have taken place in an environment of 
declining American demand for foreign petroleum resources and interest in the Middle 
East in general. America’s involvement in the Middle East to address its energy security 
concerns is deep and longstanding. Building on goodwill created by earlier American 
investment and expertise in the Saudi kingdom during the 1930s, U.S. President Franklin 
Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdulaziz Al Saud reached an agreement in 1945 in which the 
U.S. guaranteed Saudi security in exchange for an unimpeded flow of oil to global 
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markets.99 Since the mid-2000s, however, American interest in the region has declined, 
and an increasing number of policymakers and academics have advocated for less U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East. Part of this is due to a generalized war-weariness and a 
desire to avoid fomenting/participating in conflicts in the region.100 Perhaps even more 
impactful, though, are the recent, dramatic increases in American domestic petroleum 
production that have resulted from the utilization of new and innovative technologies to 
release so-called “tight oil” from shale rock formations (especially by hydraulic fracturing, 
or “fracking”). As the U.S. progressively imports less oil (see Figure 4) and becomes a 
major producer in its own right, oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia are increasingly 
pushing for other foreign customers.101  
 
Figure 4. U.S. Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1993–2019102 
It is in these dynamics that the reciprocal Sino-Saudi interests reside. The longevity 
of Saudi Arabia’s monarchy has been integrally connected to the prospect of developing 
relations with one of the world’s most dynamic rising powers.103 Conversely, China has 
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expanded the efforts that it initiated in the 1980s and grew in the 1990s to build stronger 
political ties with countries that can provide needed natural resources and, when necessary, 
diplomatic support and credibility. Considering that, as Joshua Eisenman and Eric 
Heginbotham observe, “Beijing’s political and economic goals are inseparable,”104 and 
that Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on continued Chinese involvement in its economy, 
it is only reasonable for one to assess the impact that China’s economic activity has had on 
Saudi political decision-making in response to China’s actions in multilateral and bilateral 
arenas. 
C. SAUDI POLITICAL RESPONSES 
1. United Nations Voting 
The data analyzed here consists of UNGA votes that have been categorized under 
the general “Human Rights” label. This data has been further disaggregated into two 
separate categories: votes that address general human rights principles and votes that 
respond to regional- or country-specific situations. General votes typically address 
principles such as the supposed “right to food,” “right to development,” and right to an 
“equitable geographical distribution in the membership of the human rights treaty bodies.” 
As one can see, these already unenforceable resolutions address issues that are themselves 
difficult to define, but they can still serve important functions in terms of messaging and 
posturing on the international stage. Situational votes, on the other hand, address specific 
happenings in certain countries and regions, such as those in Iran, North Korea, and other 
troubled areas and states in the world. Although unenforceable, they can be seen as a 
normative and more direct critique, which countries do take seriously.105 
With regards to the general votes, it is readily apparent that there is a high degree 
of voting overlap between Saudi Arabia and China. Of the 183 resolutions voted on 
between 1997 and 2018 that address general human rights principles, Saudi Arabia voted 
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“Yes” 160 times, which equates to 87.4% of the time. This is virtually identical to China’s 
record during this period, which translates into 159 “Yes” votes, and this degree of 
alignment has generally been consistent over time. This voting proportion is the reverse of 
the U.S. “Yes” proportion, which stands at 10.9% for the same time period. What is most 
interesting, however, is the Saudi response to those specific resolutions whose sponsorship 
includes China. To date, China has specifically sponsored or co-sponsored 72 resolutions 
in this category, which mostly address principles of noninterference and state 
sovereignty.106 Of these, the Saudi delegation voted “Yes” 70 times (with absences 
counting for the other two occurrences), or 97% of the time. There is no measurable change 
in the frequency of these “Yes” votes. Instead, Saudi support for Chinese resolutions has 
been near-constant since the beginning of recorded sponsorship. This dynamic is indicative 
of a degree of overlap between Chinese and Saudi interests related to general issues such 
as the preservation of state sovereignty or Saudi Arabia’s willingness to align its votes with 
Chinese preferences. 
If Saudi Arabia is following China’s lead and acting to preserve China’s economic 
influence, then it would be expected that these vote proportions would match those related 
to situational human rights resolutions. In other words, one would expect that Saudi votes 
increasingly move in a direction that promotes noninterference at the expense of 
condemnations of specific situations in which human rights abuses have been observed. It 
is clear, however, that this is not exactly the case. Of the 78 total resolutions sponsored by 
the U.S. in this category, Saudi Arabia has voted in the affirmative 40 times, or 51.3% of 
the time. While this does not demonstrate total consensus with U.S. interests, it is 
significantly different from China’s votes, of which zero were cast in support of U.S.-led 
initiatives. This evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia is generally less opposed to specific 
interventions in certain human rights cases, and that it is also less inclined to respond 
negatively to U.S.-led human rights efforts. 
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Indeed, further disaggregation of the data reveals that over time, Saudi support for 
certain issues has actually increased in the face of continued Chinese opposition to those 
same issues. As an example, the UNGA has approved resolutions condemning the human 
rights situation in Iran, one of China’s key economic and diplomatic partners,107 virtually 
every year since 1996; all of these have been co-sponsored by the U.S. In the decade 
between 1997 and 2007, the Saudi delegation consistently voted “No,” refusing 
opportunities to condemn an otherwise bitter regional rival. Interestingly enough, however, 
this opposition to the U.S.-led effort transitioned to abstentions between 1998 and 2015, 
and, in the four years since 2015, to “Yes” votes. This pattern mirrors that which describes 
the Saudi reaction to the resolutions concerning the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in 
Myanmar between 2006 and 2019; over time, abstentions have changed to affirmative 
votes. Additionally, Saudi support for U.S.-led resolutions between 2005 and 2015 
condemning North Korea, another of China’s key partners, for its human rights violations 
remained virtually unchanged. While China has consistently opposed all of these 
resolutions, Saudi Arabia has instead increasingly voted with the U.S. and moved toward 
a relatively more active position in condemning human rights violations. Thus, China was 
either unable or unwilling in these instances to marshal its influence and prevent official 
condemnation of partners and allies. 
Between 1993 and the present day, China has sponsored numerous general 
resolutions affirming noninterference, but it has not sponsored a single resolution that 
addresses specific situations involving human rights abuses around the world. While this 
may be in accordance with China’s preference to use its role in global governance to 
rhetorically uphold principles of sovereignty, it does run counter to the interests of the 
Saudi Arabian government, which actively intervenes in some areas (e.g., Yemen), and has 
demonstrated interest in others (e.g., Syria). Taken together, the stark differences in voting 
behavior suggest that both active U.S. involvement in these multilateral processes and 
Saudi Arabia’s own regional and domestic interests are significant factors in whether or 
not Saudi Arabia decides to go on record supporting Chinese initiatives. In other words, 
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this evidence implies that, while Chinese economic engagement, growing interdependence, 
and demand for petroleum may be factors in Saudi support for broader, overarching 
measures, they appear to be ineffective in altering Saudi positions on American initiatives 
or regional events in which the Saudi government determines it has a vested national 
interest. 
2. The Uyghur Issue 
The Uyghur situation in China’s western Xinjiang province and the Saudi reaction 
to it presents an interesting case study in this regard. To date, there has been little Saudi 
condemnation of the persecution of this group. In some ways this is surprising, for China’s 
actions, which have largely been motivated by an explicit desire to reduce the social and 
religious impacts that Islam has on this native population,108 are becoming more 
conspicuous over time on the international stage.  
An informed observer might expect the Saudi leadership to react in a strong fashion, 
for the monarchy has traditionally been seen and sees itself as the primary guardian of 
Islam. Indeed, the current monarch, King Salman, is referred to not only as the political 
leader of a state, but also as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” a reference to the 
king’s role the symbolic protector of two of the holiest Islamic sites in Mecca and 
Medina.109 While it should be noted that Saudi Arabia has gained notoriety for its own 
persecution of domestic minority groups (especially Christians and Shiite Muslims),110 its 
traditional place as the heart of Sunni Islam has led it to advocate for the plights of several 
disadvantaged Muslim groups around the world; these include the Palestinian populations 
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in the West Bank and Gaza111 and the Rohingya minority group of Myanmar.112 There is 
certainly a precedent for the Saudi leadership to comment on and criticize the domestic 
practices of other nations as they concern Muslim minorities. 
Instead of criticizing China, though, Saudi Arabia has gone on the record, 
supporting China’s actions in Xinjiang. This was made most apparent in July 2019, when 
Saudi Arabia joined thirty-seven other countries in signing an official letter to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).113 This letter, which was a response to the 
earlier one that condemned the actions in question,114 instead commended “China’s 
remarkable achievements in the field of human rights” and “call [ed] on relevant countries 
to refrain from employing unfounded charges against China based on unconfirmed 
information before they visit Xinjiang.”115 Additionally, MBS (while on a visit to China 
to sign trade deals) defended the PRC’s “right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-
extremization work for its national security.”116 Since 1990, as Mohammed al-Sudairi 
 
111 “Saudi Foreign Minister Reiterates Kingdom’s Support for Palestine,” The Embassy of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed September 3, 2020, https://www.saudiembassy.net/press-release/saudi-
foreign-minister-reiterates-kingdom%E2%80%99s-support-palestine. 
112 “Kingdom Demands End to Government Discrimination Against Rohingya,” The Embassy of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed September 3, 2020, https://www.saudiembassy.net/news/kingdom-
demands-end-government-discrimination-against-rohingya. 
113 Michelle Nichols, “Saudi Arabia Defends Letter Backing China’s Xinjiang Policy,” Reuters, July 
18, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-saudi-idUSKCN1UD36J. 
114 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Letter Dated 8 July 2019 from the Permanent 
Representatives of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
Office at Geneva Addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/41/G/11, 2019. 
115 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Letter Dated 12 July 2019 from the Representatives of 
Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, the Congo, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the 
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
the State of Palestine to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the President of the Human 
Rights Council, A/HRC/41/G/17 (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2019). 
116 Josie Ensor, “Saudi Crown Prince Defends China’s Right to Put Uighur Muslims in Concentration 
Camps,” The Telegraph, February 22, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/02/22/saudi-crown-
prince-defends-chinas-right-put-uighur-muslims-concentration/. 
31 
points out, “the Saudi state has actively sought to sideline the [Uyghur] issue from being 
an irritant to the development of cordial Sino-Saudi ties”117; the statements by MBS are 
consistent  this trend. A deepening relationship with China, predicated on strengthened 
economic ties and the absence of American presence,118 is correlated with deleterious 
attitudes toward persecution and certain other human rights issues. 
It should be noted, however, that while the Saudi signature of the August 9 letter 
may be a conspicuous rhetorical blow to the global human rights regime, this specific Saudi 
position is neither new nor without precedent. While some of this silence may be caused 
by a desire for continued economic development, the Saudi position is also heavily 
influenced by a fear of political Islam and other related separatist movements.119 Indeed, 
when one views these instances through the lens of the attempted seizure of the Grand 
Mosque of Mecca in 1979,120 it is easier for one to understand the Saudi monarchy’s 
reactions to dynamics which are generally perceived to pose a threat to continued state rule. 
In this sense, longstanding domestic sensitivities that naturally result from Saudi Arabia’s 
authoritarian regime type cannot be discounted in any analysis of the Saudi reaction to the 
Uyghur issue. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that, while the Saudi governmental reaction to 
atrocities against Uyghurs has been ambivalent at best, the popular reaction has been more 
decisive. In 2009, riots in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Province, and the PRC’s heavy-
handed response to them, precipitated a significant shift in Saudi media coverage of China. 
Much as earlier situations in Bosnia and Chechnya has had done in the 1990s, the events 
in Xinjiang animated the Saudi public in noticeable ways. Articles in a number of popular 
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Saudi publications during that period, including Al-Eqtisadiyyah, Al-Madina, Al-Riyadh, 
Okaz, and Al-Watan criticized China’s actions in unsparing terms and were generally 
sympathetic with the plight of a population with which many Saudis feel religious kinship. 
The juxtaposition between the responses of the government and the public does illustrate 
the effect of China’s economic influence in this regard, but it is also reasonable to assert 
that these public sentiments will serve as a limiting factor in how far the Saudi monarchy 
goes in supporting China on this issue.121 
Still, it should be appreciated that the Saudi government has acted in a way that 
conforms to CCP preferences regarding this issue. This fact suggests that China’s economic 
influence in the form of its demand for energy has influenced the Saudi government’s 
position on this specific topic. 
3. Bilateral Relations with the U.S. 
If the theory presented in the literature holds, then one would expect Saudi arms 
transactions and certain forms of diplomatic activity with the U.S. to be on a downward 
trend as a result of the country’s growing economic relationship with China. The actual 
dynamics on the ground, however, do not necessarily correspond with the theoretical 
projections. To date, it appears that China’s economic engagement has had little bearing 
on Saudi decisions to engage with the U.S. on security and political issues.  
In terms of arms sales, the relationship between Washington and Riyadh is robust. 
One method of measuring this is by valuing arms transactions by their trend-indicator value 
(TIV). According to the SIPRI, the TIV is “is based on the known unit production costs of 
a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather 
than the financial value of the transfer.”122 Focusing on military capabilities allows for a 
more comprehensive analysis of weapons transactions than that which would come through 
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measuring financial values alone.123 By this metric, Saudi-U.S. relations are strong (see 
Figure 5). During the almost three decades between 1993 and 2019, the value of arms 
transfers from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia has increased by more than 150%, with transfers 
in the decade between 2009 and 2019 alone increasing more than twelvefold. During the 
same time period, reported transfers from China to Saudi Arabia have been negligible; 
Sino-Saudi transactions between 2015 and 2019 represent barely 5% of those made from 
the U.S. in 2019. The U.S. security partnership with Saudi Arabia remains strong, even in 
the face of a conspicuous Chinese presence. 
 
Figure 5. SIPRI TIVs of Official Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia, 1993–
2019124 
The frequency and visibility of diplomatic visits between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia 
has likewise remained robust during the period between 1993 and the present. Saudi Arabia 
has received the U.S. Secretary of State at least once during every single year between 
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1990 and 2020.125 This trend has only strengthened in recent years; over the past decade, 
American delegations have been received an average of three times per year, with six visits 
in 2016 alone.126 In comparison, while China’s president and senior Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officials have conducted numerous phone calls during the same period, there have 
been far fewer official visits between the two countries.127 This dynamic is representative 
of the growing relationship between the two countries, but to date it appears to have had 
little effect on the willingness of the Saudi leadership to meet with American leaders and 
continue the practical and symbolic solidification of the U.S.-Saudi partnership. 
D. CONCLUSION 
China’s economic presence in Saudi Arabia is deep and growing. China depends in 
no small part on Saudi energy resources to fuel its growing economy, while the Saudi 
monarchy is heavily dependent on continued Chinese demand and markets as an element 
of regime stability. With all of that being said, evidence suggests that China’s engagement, 
while significant, is not the sole element in the political calculus of the Saudi government 
in certain multilateral and bilateral arenas. The Saudi government has responded to the 
Uyghur situation in a way that is favorable to the CCP’s interests, but it has not shifted its 
UNGA voting or weakened its partnership with the U.S. As such, Chinese influence in 
Saudi Arabia appears to be limited in scope. 
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III. CHINA AND EGYPT 
The most prominent element of the strengthening Sino-Egyptian relationship is 
China’s BRI and other related infrastructure development efforts. Although China’s levels 
of trade with Egypt are significant, they pale in comparison to the financial scale of China’s 
trade with other regional states128 and the potential domestic political impacts of 
development projects encompassed by the BRI. This fact, coupled with the BRI’s 
prominence in the scholarly literature that addresses the global spread of China’s influence, 
and Egypt’s historically strong security relationship with the United States, warrants a 
deeper analysis of the implications of China’s involvement with Egypt, focusing on BRI 
projects. 
China’s engagement with Egypt appears to be paying dividends for Beijing that 
extend beyond the economic sphere. Although Egypt’s official behavior in international 
institutions such as the UNGA appears to be unaffected, its public relations and 
bureaucratic responses to controversial issues that China considers core interests 
(specifically, the Uyghur issue in Xinjiang) have changed to better align with the interests 
of the Chinese government. This dynamic, when combined with indicators that signal a 
weakening of the Egyptian reliance on American security and political power in the region, 
suggests that China’s development-based economic engagement strategy may have 
broader geopolitical motivations and implications.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The origins of the contemporary Sino-Egyptian relationship can be traced back to 
the mid-twentieth century. Maoist China’s support of Egypt during the early years of the 
Cold War, particularly as it pertains to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s perceived anti-imperialist 
efforts in the face of British, French, and Israeli aggression in 1956.129 The bilateral 
relations that were developed through this interaction contributed to Egypt becoming “the 
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first Arab and African country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic 
of China.”130 It also led to Egypt being one of the 76 countries that voted in favor of UN 
Resolution 2758, formally recognizing the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of 
China to the United Nations.”131 These circumstances demonstrate that Egypt has been a 
prominent supporter of the PRC since its emergence as a power on the global stage. 
The countries’ historical relationship has only been strengthened by in 
contemporary times Egypt joining the multitude of bilateral and multilateral institutions 
that China has created in the region to enhance trade and investment with Arab and African 
countries.132 Key among these was China and Egypt’s agreement to the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership that was signed in 2014, an act that placed Egypt in an exclusive 
group of only five MENA states that have such agreements with China.133 As noted 
previously, although these agreements do not represent formal commitments, they do 
represent China’s and partner states’ interests in solidifying long-term, stable, and all-
encompassing relations.134 Further, as Fulton observes, Egypt’s ascension to the 
uppermost rung of China’s diplomatic hierarchy “indicates that Beijing perceives [it] as 
[one of] the most important regional states.”135 Put simply, as time has gone on, relations 
between these two states have only strengthened as each recognizes the economic value of 
the other. 
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B. CONTEMPORARY SINO–EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT   
More than energy, trade, or other measures of economic output, the most prominent 
feature of contemporary Sino-Egyptian relations is Egypt’s involvement in China’s BRI. 
Cooperation on infrastructure development with countries such as Egypt is a key 
component of the larger “1+2+3” model that currently guides China’s relations with 
partners in the MENA region. According to “China’s Arab Policy Paper,” the document 
that articulates the PRC’s overarching approach in the Middle East, “infrastructure 
construction [and] investment facilitation” (2) comprise “two wings” that support other 
efforts related to energy cooperation (1) and technological development (3).136 In this 
context, Egypt is a key node in China’s approach to the region. Since Egyptian President 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and President Xi Jinping’s reciprocal state visits in 2014 and 2016, 
respectively, and el-Sisi’s subsequent signing of the requisite BRI Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), China has only fortified its reputation as a massive investor in both 
Egypt and the MENA region as a whole.137 
China’s engagement with Egypt on these terms is by no means insubstantial or 
insignificant. While China has a history of investing in Egyptian infrastructure that predates 
the more recent developments spearheaded by Xi Jinping, the amounts of those investments 
have increased dramatically over the past half decade (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Combined Values of Chinese Investments and Construction 
Contracts in Egypt, 2006–2020138 
Between 2006 and 2014,139 the year of el-Sisi’s first visit to Beijing and a 
significant Chinese investment agreement,140 the average annual value Chinese 
investments and construction contracts in Egypt was roughly $88 billion. In the six years 
between 2014 and 2020, however, this value grew to more than $190 billion, more than 
doubling the average annual value of contracts during the preceding period. During the 
same period, FDI inflows as a percentage of Egyptian GDP more than doubled, increasing 
from 1.5 % in 2006 to nearly 3% by 2019.141 China’s demonstrable commitment to 
expanding its involvement in terms of infrastructure development highlights its importance 
to Egyptian national interests in those terms. 
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1. China’s Motivations and Activities 
As noted previously, Egypt plays a significant role in Chinese planning and 
economic engagement with the rest of the world. Because Egypt maintains sovereignty 
over the Suez Canal, it is commonly viewed by Chinese thinkers, planners, and 
policymakers as a hub of the nautical components of BRI, the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). 
Egypt, by way of the Suez, connects the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, and provides the 
shortest maritime route between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.142 This is a 
critical factor for policymakers in Beijing, as 20% of global trade volume, or 70% of the 
world’s trade value, passes through the Indian Ocean annually.143 On a more specific and 
impactful level, ships transport more than 90% of China’s international trade,144 with 
roughly $1 trillion worth of those goods transiting the Canal and Red Sea area every 
year.145 When viewed through this lens, it is evident why the CCP leadership would be so 
attracted to building relations with Egyptian leaders. Continued economic growth in China, 
which undergirds the domestic legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), depends 
in no small part on the continued access to and development of strategic chokepoints and 
waterways. Put simply, the Suez is a key component not only of the MSR specifically, but 
also of China’s larger global ambitions and its domestic political stability. 
In terms of activities, the most significant of China’s infrastructure investment 
efforts in Egypt can be bifurcated into two categories: those which are centered on the Suez 
Canal, and those which pertain to the growing Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone) that 
is located near the physical canal. In terms of the canal itself, substantial levels of Chinese 
investments have gone towards supporting the renovations of the two most important ports, 
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Ismailia and Port Said.146 Port Said’s Suez Canal Container Terminal, the largest container 
terminal in that part of the world, stands out. In addition to owning a 20 percent share in 
the container facility on a 49-year concession, Chinese SOEs have also invested more than 
$800 million in recent years for physical and logistical upgrades.147 China’s engagement 
on this issue has certainly paid dividends; recent enlargement operations funded in large 
part by Chinese firms have doubled the capacity and traffic flow between the 
Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea.148 This is part of a broader trend which describes efforts 
by China’s SOEs to aggressively invest in ports and waterways from the Red Sea to the 
Mediterranean, thereby ensuring reliable access to Western markets for Chinese firms.149 
China’s Suez-related economic interests, while not novel developments, have resulted not 
only in increasing levels of efficiency in logistical nodes of global importance, but also a 
more visible Chinese presence throughout the region. 
The enthusiasm which marks expansion of the Suez Canal can also be observed in 
the development of the SCZone. According to state media sources, the SCZone is promoted 
as “a world-class free zone and trade hub along the banks of the newly-expanded Suez 
Canal.”150 Although the Egyptian government did have tentative plans for a zone 
specifically set aside for economic innovation that predated the BRI by more than a decade, 
these ideas only became viable with the recent influx of Chinese investment capital.151 
Since Egypt joined the BRI and el-Sisi’s signed the $18.3 billion in SCZone-specific 
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agreements with Chinese firms in 2018, plans have been drawn up for water pumping and 
storage facilities in Ataqa, electric train facilities, coal fired-plants in the port of 
Hamrawein, construction improvements in Ain Sokhna port, and various other 
megaprojects throughout the area.152  
Egypt’s New Administrative Capital (NAC) is particularly prominent. Located far 
from downtown Cairo, the NAC is intended be Egypt’s bureaucratic capital of the future, 
one that is relatively isolated from a restive population that has demonstrated a propensity 
to engage in mass protests.153 The China State Construction Engineering Corporation has 
led the way in the development of the new Central Business District, an area of commercial 
and financial enterprises within the NAC that is projected as the future hub of Egyptian 
economic advancement.154 Construction projects under the umbrella of these initiatives 
have continued unabated, even during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2019–2021.155 
Although not all of the commitments have been actualized to date, it is evident that 
assurances of Chinese investment have been integral to Egypt’s development plans, 
especially in challenging times. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of Sino-Egyptian cooperation in this sphere 
is the China-Egypt Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA) Suez 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (SETC), “the gold intersection point of ‘the Belt 
and Road’ strategy of China and the ‘Suez Canal Corridor’ strategy of Egypt.”156 In short, 
this area is a PRC-sponsored economic cooperation zone that is aimed at propelling 
cooperation between China and Egypt by providing land, labor and capital resources for 
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Chinese manufacturing, trade, financial, and other economic initiatives.157 To date, the 
1.34 square kilometer zone contains more than 60 Chinese manufacturing and service 
enterprises.158 Chinese and Egyptian leaders have designated an additional six square 
kilometers for construction in the near term, with 20 square kilometers planned for the long 
term.159 The development of this zone is an example of the “win-win cooperation” that the 
Chinese government emphasizes; TEDA-SETC provides jobs and training opportunities 
for thousands of Egyptian workers, while Chinese industries have yet another area in which 
to spread and exploit inexpensive labor.160  
In broader terms, the TEDA-SETC is the physical manifestation of a major 
commitment by the Chinese government to utilize direct investment to directly facilitate 
Egyptian economic growth. From this perspective, major BRI projects like the TEDA-
SETC are conspicuous examples of potential vectors of reliance of client states, like Egypt, 
on the PRC.  
2. Egypt’s Motivations for Welcoming Chinese Investment 
The Egypt Vision 2030 plan, which was first launch in February 2016, has led to 
an increasing need to attract foreign investment into the country and provides fertile ground 
for increased levels of foreign direct investment from Chinese sources. Like a number of 
other countries in the MENA region, the Egyptian government has embarked on a program 
of growth based on sustainable development and economic rejuvenation, targets that are 
epitomized through the development of critical infrastructure.161 Notable goals of Egypt 
Vision 2030 include the improvement of the “quality of life and standard of living of the 
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Egyptian citizens” and the “governance of state and community institutions.” 162 As 
Egyptian leaders also openly acknowledge, however, another significant goal of this 
strategy and its calls for investment is to “strengthen Egyptian leadership.”163 Regardless 
of whether Vision 2030 is aimed primarily at improving the lives of everyday Egyptians 
or maintaining the legitimacy of the government, it is clearly evident that the Egyptian 
leadership is incentivized to align significant components of its economic and political 
interests with China’s implementation of its BRI in the region, as the influx of economic 
resources is seen to have a bolstering effect on the rule of the domestic government and 
may help mitigate the destabilizing conditions that led to the Arab Spring revolutions. 
It is in this sense, then, that one should assess the impacts that such forms of Chinese 
engagement have had on the political responses of the Egyptian government 
C. EGYPTIAN POLITICAL RESPONSES 
1. United Nations Voting 
Egypt’s voting behavior in the UNGA is somewhat aligned with China’s. This fact 
suggests some compatibility between Chinese and Egyptian interests. The similarity in 
voting patterns, however, it is not generalized or comprehensive across all issues of 
interests to Egypt and China. In this sense, Egypt’s voting patterns do not signal that within 
the specific context of the UNGA, Egypt is a constituent state following in China’s lead.  
In terms of China-sponsored UN resolutions that address general human rights 
situations, Egypt has voted “Yes” on all 72 resolutions, or 100% of the time. This is 
particularly noteworthy when juxtaposed against the fact that the United States has 
responded with a “No” vote to every single one of these resolutions. This voting pattern 
signals that on issues such as the “promotion of a democratic and equitable international 
order,” “globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights,” and other 
principles that imply dissatisfaction with contemporary multilateral views and applications 
of liberalism, Chinese and Egyptian interests align. This dissatisfaction cannot be observed 
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in the Egyptian responses to U.S.-sponsored initiatives, however. Of the 16 resolutions that 
the U.S. has sponsored between 2000 and 2018, Egypt cast voted “Yes” 14 times, “No” 
zero times, and abstained only twice. This number of “Yes” votes in response to U.S.-
sponsored resolutions is significantly higher than either Saudi Arabia or China, who voted 
in the affirmative ten and eight times, respectively. When viewed alongside the fact that 
the two U.S. resolutions that Egypt abstained from voting on lacked historical 
precedents164 and thus cannot be taken as a change in Egyptian voting behavior, it is 
apparent that China has not caused Egypt to turn away from the United States. 
Egypt’s responses to resolutions that address human rights situations in specific 
countries and regions around the world likewise represent only a limited degree of overlap 
with and/or influence from the Chinese government. In response to the human rights 
situation in Iran, both Egypt and China have refused to cast “Yes” votes to condemn the 
Iranian regime every year since 1996. This trend parallels the one for resolutions 
condemning the North Korea regime, a situation in which Egypt has voted only once in the 
affirmative. In response to the situation in Syria, a country which shares deep historical ties 
with Egypt, the Egyptian delegation did shift from condemning the ruling regime of Bashar 
al-Assad outright to abstaining during the three most recent votes (2017, 2018, and 2019), 
a move which brought Egypt’s votes more into alignment with China’s. This, however, 
likely has more to do with a broader Egyptian interest in maintaining regional stability165 
and limiting the spread of post-Arab Spring radical Islamism166 than it does bending to 
explicit Chinese influence or preferences. Put differently, while Egypt’s votes have 
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mirrored China’s, there is little evidence that this reflects an increasing level of alignment 
between the interests of the two countries. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy sequence of votes in this category, though, is that 
which has addressed the situation of the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. 
Like the delegations from both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the Egyptian delegation shifted 
their responses in 2011, from the six consecutive years of “No” votes on resolutions 
addressing the issue to “Yes” votes, condemning the actions of Myanmar government. This 
is significant, for it represents a shift against China’s interest in limiting international 
criticism of Myanmar’s ruling regime.167 This change is especially notable because it 
occurred during the implementation of the BRI framework in 2014. In this specific case, 
China was either unable or unwilling to marshal enough influence with Egypt to prevent 
the international rebuke of a regional partner with which is seeks to deepen ties.168 
Overall, while Egypt’s UNGA votes do align with China’s in a number of instances, 
there is simply not enough evidence to support the assertion that China has influenced 
Egypt at a level high enough for Egypt to be considered a reliable constituent state within 
multilateral institutions that will consistently vote to support all issues that the Chinese 
leadership perceives as important. 
2. The Uyghur Issue 
While the relationship between China’s influence and Egypt’s UNGA voting 
behavior can be described as inconclusive, there is no ambiguity with regards to Egypt’s 
response to the Chinese government’s repression of its Uyghur minority. Simply put, 
Egyptian leaders have not only proffered rhetorical platitudes on the international stage, 
but have also actively assisted Beijing’s efforts by deporting individual Uyghurs to China 
for internment. Evidence suggests, therefore, that China’s influence, combined with other 
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internal motivators, has directly contributed to the Egyptian government’s willingness to 
support and utilize repressive measures to directly support Chinese interests. 
A survey of popular media sources and government documents shows that prior to 
China’s formal initiation of the BRI in Egypt in 2014, there were few journalistic mentions 
of or governmental actions taken against Muslim Uyghurs residing in Egypt. This situation 
changed, however, after Beijing’s crackdown began in mainland China in 2014. By July 
2017, the Egyptian government had initiated a months-long campaign that resulted in the 
deportation of 22 Uyghurs to China and indefinite detention of more than 200 others.169 
Most of these individuals had been in Cairo studying at the well-known Islamic scholarly 
institution, Al-Azhar.170 In addition to deporting and detaining these individuals, who were 
labeled “terrorists,” Egyptian authorities also conducted interrogations at the behest of the 
Chinese government.171 Many of these encounters were described as harsh and 
intrusive.172 This is direct evidence that Egyptian leaders have acted at the behest of the 
Chinese government on this particular issue. 
These actions are demonstrative of Egypt’s rhetorical support for China’s actions 
in international arenas. Indeed, when one takes into account the Egyptian government’s 
aforementioned activities, it is unsurprising that, in the divide between the dueling letters 
that were submitted to the president of the UNHRC in July 2019, Egypt came down firmly 
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on the side that supported Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang.173 The sentiments and motivations 
behind this support appear to be lasting, as Egypt repeated its actions by refusing to join 
the 39 other countries that once again condemned China over this issue in October 2020.174 
Instead, the Egyptian delegation united with 44 other countries in releasing a statement that 
praised China for its “openness and transparency” as it seeks to “protect human rights” and 
“safeguard the human rights of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang.”175 
It must be noted that some scholars have highlighted a number of domestic factors 
that would motivate the Egyptian national leadership to lean towards being permissive or 
supportive of Uyghur oppression. These include the regionally-widespread fear of political 
Islam (to which Egypt is especially sensitive to in the wake of the Arab Spring), a desire 
to limit the spread of separatist movements, and a general concurrence with China on 
upholding principles of noninterference within national borders.176 Overall, though, 
China’s significance to the Egyptian government’s desire for economic growth and 
development cannot be overlooked in any analysis of Cairo’s responses to the Uyghur 
issue. It stands to reason, then, that China’s economic involvement has induced a shift in 
Egyptian political behavior. 
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3. Bilateral Relations with the United States 
According to the central hypothesis of this thesis, one of the indicators of the effects 
of China’s engagement with the countries that it is economically involved with is a reduced 
reliance on the United States, which is perceived to be in relative decline. If this assertion 
holds, then one would expect to see an observable degradation in the security relationship 
between the U.S. and Egypt. Put differently, is Egypt building ties with one power at the 
expense of another? 
Evidence from arms sales data suggests that Egypt is indeed weakening its security 
relationship with the U.S. The value of arms sales and transfers between the two countries 
have been steadily declining since their peak in the early 1990s (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. SIPRI TIVs of Official Arms Exports to Egypt, 1993–2019177 
During the period between 1993 and 2000, the annual value of arms transactions 
between the two countries averaged $979 million. This value decreased to $418.5 million 
per year during the decade between 2001 and 2010, and sank even further to $251.9 million 
per year during the decade between 2011 and 2020. Although nominal, these figures 
 


















































































nonetheless represent a negative direction in terms of transactions. U.S. policy initiatives 
resulting from American criticism of Egypt’s democratization and human rights record 
partly explain this trend.178 Perhaps more impactful, though, is the increasing willingness 
in Egypt’s leadership to seek out alternative sources for arms in its own right. This dynamic 
is especially apparent as it relates to Russia and France over the past decade (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Sources of Egyptian Arms Purchases, 2000–2016179 
Overall, it should be appreciated that Egypt is diversifying its sources of arms. This 
phenomenon may not be caused by any one country in particular, but it does signal that 
Egypt is generally moving away from the U.S. and towards other powers that are viewed 
as more willing to satisfy Egyptian needs. One area in which Egypt has expanded relations 
with China is purchases of unmanned aerial vehicles,180 an area in which China faces little 
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competition due to treaty restrictions in other countries.181 In a broader sense, Egypt’s 
increasing reliance on other states for arms can be interpreted as a logical response to 
growing perceptions of American withdrawal from the region. These dynamics, combined 
with increased Chinese engagement in other spheres, generally do not bode well for the 
advancement of U.S. interests in the future if those interests are perceived by partner states 
as antithetical to those of a more active and involved PRC. 
Changes in the frequency of diplomatic visits between the Egyptian head of state 
and American senior leaders also signal the fact that the U.S.-Egypt relationship may be 
weakening. During the period between 1993 and 2013, the president of Egypt averaged .83 
visits to Washington, D.C., per year. This figure dropped to .57 visits per year during period 
between 2014 and 2020.182 Of the latter set of visits, only one visit was with the sitting 
U.S. president.183 The number of visits by American officials to Cairo have declined 
correspondingly. The U.S. secretary of state averaged 2.38 visits per year between 1993 
and 2013, but only 1.42 visits between 2014 and 2020.184 The president of the United 
States, meanwhile, averaged .38 visits per year between 1993 and 2013, but travelled to 
Cairo zero times between 2014 and 2020.185 Indeed, an American president has not made 
a visit to the Egyptian capital since President Obama’s visit early in his first term in 
2009.186 By contrast, the Chinese president or premier has met with the Egyptian head of 
state at least once every year over the same time period.187 While Egypt’s political 
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relationship with the U.S. has been on a downward trend, its diplomatic relations with the 
PRC appear to have only improved. Evidence suggests that these stronger ties are 
undergirded Egypt’s BRI participation and China’s broader engagement with the Arab 
Republic. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The case of Egypt demonstrates the geopolitical potential inherent in China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative. While the BRI has not induced a wholesale transformation in Egyptian 
political behavior in certain multilateral arenas (specifically as it relates to other issues that 
interest China), it has served as a basis of influence for shaping perceptions of and reactions 
to China’s actions both inside and outside the bounds of institutions. It is also apparent that 
this influence is correlated with a weakening of the contemporary U.S.-Egypt relationship. 
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IV. CHINA AND JORDAN 
The People’s Republic of China’s strategic and economic ties with the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan can best be characterized as being friendly and growing, but still 
relatively weak. While there have been numerous pronouncements that have hailed the 
“fruitful results” of Chinese-Jordanian cooperation,188 these developments have been less 
significant than those that define China’s relations with other countries in the Middle East, 
to include Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Jordan, in turn, has historically been more dependent 
on partners other than China to help ensure its economic and military security. It is thus 
unsurprising that the collective Jordanian response to Chinese political and diplomatic 
initiatives has been mixed, at best, and does not wholly conform to Chinese aims. In this 
case, evidence suggests that lower levels of Chinese economic activity in terms of trade, 
infrastructure investment, or oil demand result in a less robust diplomatic response from 
partner countries. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Established by European colonial powers in the aftermath of World War I, Jordan 
is a small state whose identity has traditionally been defined by a combination of the 
British-imposed Hashemite monarchy, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the 
ensuing migrations and integration of the Palestinian peoples into the Jordanian population 
and economy.189 The effects of this history has unsurprisingly resulted in a foreign policy 
outlook that is centered on the events that arise from the Palestinian issue and other sources 
of potential instability in the Levant (e.g., the Arab Spring). While Jordan does have strong 
relations with the great powers (the most notable of these being its relationship with the 
United States), relationships with states that lay farther afield and have had little 
involvement in the Middle East peace processes or security environment have been of 
lesser importance. It is thus unsurprising that, with the exception of Jordan’s diplomatic 
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recognition of the People’s Republic in 1977,190 the historical relationship between China 
and Jordan lacks much substance. Indeed, from a methodological perspective, little 
scholarly research and analysis that concern contemporary Sino-Jordanian ties exist. The 
analyses that are present in the scholarly literature are usually only components of broader 
studies that focus on the Middle East as a whole or the Levant (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, 
and Syria) in particular. This indicates that these relations are relatively insubstantial in the 
broader Sino-Middle Eastern hierarchy of relationships. 
In terms of overall ties, Jordan signed a strategic partnership agreement with China 
in 2015. While on the surface this may appear substantial, it should be appreciated that 
such agreements codify little more than an intention to “coordinate more closely on 
regional and international affairs”191; they do not signal membership in China’s BRI or 
any other related framework. Additionally, China has committed to either a Strategic 
Partnership or a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with virtually every country in the 
Arab world (the only expectations being the war-torn countries of Yemen and Syria).192 
In this sense, then, Jordanian intentions to enhance cooperation with the PRC are not 
unique, and have thus far not proven to be significant in any observable sense. 
In the contemporary context, hard data shows that even though Jordan remains a 
small country with few natural resources and a multitude of ethnic and demographic 
challenges, it has not taken steps to increase its reliance on China. It is instead still heavily 
dependent on aid from outside Western and Arab sources, with support from the United 
States and Saudi Arabia being most conspicuous.193 Jordan’s challenges lead it to seek 
development and trade with the rest of the world, dynamics that is leaders hope will help 
grow the Jordanian economy, which is all the more important in the aftermath of an 
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extended period of slow GDP growth.194 In spite of this, Jordan’s economic relationship 
with China, while growing, does not appear to be a catalyzing factor in Middle East 
relations. 
B. TRADE RELATIONSHIPS 
It should be noted from the outset that Jordan’s economic relationship with China 
is not nonexistent. Observable levels of trade between China and Jordan exist, and this 
means of association has been important to Jordan’s economy for a number of years. 
During the period between 1995 and 2018, China accounted for 9.78% of Jordan’s $328 
billion of imports, which made China Jordan’s second largest trading partner in terms of 
imports. As of 2018,195 China still represents the second-largest source of Jordan’s roughly 
$22.3 billion of annual imports. This value is reflective of the growing levels of Jordanian 
imports from China overall; between 1995 and 2018, imports from China as a percentage 
of Jordan’s total imports increased more than fivefold (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Percentage of Jordanian Imports Originating in China, 1995–
2017196 
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With that being said, it should be appreciated that, while Jordan’s imports from 
China have increased over time, these increases have been at a rate roughly consonant with 
the growth of Jordan’s imports from other states, especially Saudi Arabia. This suggests 
that in terms of sources of imports as a component of economic stability and growth, 
Jordan’s primary reliance is on regional partners (rather than outside powers). Evidence of 
this dynamic can be observed in the case of the Jordanian reaction to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003. After the American-led coalition deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime and 
the economy of Iraq (which up until that point had been Jordan’s primary trading 
partner197) subsequently collapsed, Jordan responded by significantly increasing trade 
with Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the rate of growth in trade with China remained relatively 
unchanged from that which preceded 2003 (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Percentage of Jordanian Imports Originating in China, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iraq, 1995–2018198 
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The apparent disparity between trade with China and trade with other powers can 
also be observed in an analysis of Jordan’s export relationships. In these terms, China can 
be seen as a minor destination for Jordanian exports. Indeed, in comparison to Jordan’s 
four largest partners in this category (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, and the United States), 
China lags far behind. Since 1995, there has not been a single year in which exports to 
China exceeded 5% of Jordan’s total exports, whereas the other aforementioned partners 
have received an average of 9%, 13%, 11%, and 20% of Jordan’s exports, respectively (see 
Figure 11).199 Accordingly, China’s resources and demand do play roles in Jordan’s 
economic growth, but they are not as prevalent or influential as those of other Jordanian 
partners.  
 
Figure 11. Percentage of Total Jordanian Exports Based on Destination, 
1995–2018200 
From a wider perspective, Jordan’s relatively low levels of trade with China are 
consistently with a broader trend: the declining role of trade in the Jordanian economy. 
 
199 “International Trade Statistics Database,” United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 
accessed October 1, 2020, https://comtrade.un.org/. 

























































China Saudi Arabia Iraq India United States
58 
Trade as a percentage of Jordanian GDP declined from 130.5% in 1993 to 86.3% by 
2019.201 As trade has become less integral to Jordan’s economy, there is less space for 
Chinese engagement and influence on these terms. 
Part of the explanation for the aforementioned dynamics is the fact that Jordan has 
few natural resources (e.g., petroleum). Indeed, according to the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database, there have not been any reportable levels of crude 
petroleum exports that originated from Jordan within the past three decades.202 This means 
that Jordan is less susceptible to the negative forces of the “resource course” that appear to 
afflict other countries in the MENA region. Correspondingly, Jordan’s lack of petroleum 
resources means that relations with Jordan are less important to Chinese leaders, who have 
thus far prized economic ties with resource-rich states.203 It is evident, then, that neither 
trade with or resource demand from China is a significant factor in the Jordanian economic 
environment. 
C. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
In addition to trade, leaders from both China and Jordan have expressed interest in 
having the Hashemite Kingdom sign on to China’s expansive BRI. Imad Fakhoury, 
Jordan’s Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, has proclaimed that “Jordan 
will greatly benefit from the [Belt and Road Initiative] due to the kingdom’s strategic 
location in the region connecting three continents.”204 Chinese leaders have mirrored this 
optimism, with Pan Weifang, the Chinese ambassador to Jordan, noting in 2017 that “China 
is highly interested in boosting relations with Jordan and [these] ties are witnessing a 
 
201 “Trade (% of GDP) – Jordan,” World Bank, accessed February 1, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?end=2019&locations=JO&start=1993. 
202 “International Trade Statistics Database.” 
203 Economy and Levi. 
204 “China’s B&R Initiative Brings Promising Opportunities to Jordan: Minister,” Xinhua, May 17, 
2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/17/c_137184315.htm. 
59 
growing progress on all fronts.”205 This language has been echoed more recently by Xie 
Yuan, the vice president of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign 
Countries, who asserts that China is “seeking to strengthen [its] ties with Jordan” through 
initiatives such as the BRI.206 This statement is particularly noteworthy, for it is unlikely 
that the leader of the CCP-sponsored organization tasked with cultivating foreign 
partnerships to enhance China’s image on the international stage would communicate in 
ways that contradict the Party.207 In terms of rhetoric, bilateral support for China’s 
engagement with Jordan and the greater Middle East as a provider of infrastructure 
development and investment funding is strong, even if ambiguously worded. 
In some senses, this is not surprising, for Jordan, like other countries in the region, 
has placed an emphasis on national economic regeneration. This is evidenced by the 
Kingdom’s Jordan 2025 plan.208 Similar to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiative, Jordan 
2025 seeks develop a new comprehensive framework that, according to its guiding 
documents, improves governance, spurs economic and social innovation, and more 
generally “[provides] opportunities for all.”209 One of the biggest components of this is 
“enhancing the Kingdom’s energy, water, and food security” and its “position as a hub for 
regional commerce” by investing in “long-term infrastructure mega-projects.”210 From 
this perspective, then, the rhetorical enthusiasm for Chinese investment and Jordan’s 
inclusion in the framework of the BRI is not surprising. For the Jordanian leadership, 
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China’s economic involvement can potentially bolster the ruling regime’s legitimacy and 
ensure domestic stability. 
With that being said, it must be appreciated that, to date, there have note been any 
projects that fall under the official umbrella of the BRI initiated within Jordan’s borders.211 
Unlike in other countries (such as Egypt), the BRI has thus far been observable only in the 
rhetoric that surrounds it. Indeed, analysis of the BRI’s primary informational web page 
reveals that Jordan is conspicuously absent from the growing list of countries that have 
actually signed MOUs, agreements that are widely seen as serving to “substantiate the 
legitimacy of the initiative.”212 While the words of high-ranking officials may signal that 
Jordan will have a significant place in a future Sino-centric order in the Middle East, the 
actions (or lack thereof) appear to suggest otherwise. 
Outside the scope of the BRI, Chinese investments and construction contracts in 
Jordan represent a fairly insignificant portion of total Chinese investment in the region. 
According to the AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker, the combined value of all ten of 
the investment and construction contracts agreed to between 2005 and 2020 is $6.34 
billion. While this sum is noticeable, it represents only 0.3% of the total value of the 440 
contracts agreed to between China and countries in the MENA region during the same time 
period.213 Indeed, the value of Chinese investments, specifically, during this period, $1.8 
billion, represents barely 6% of Jordan’s $29.3 billion total inward FDI during this 
period.214 This relatively low level of FDI is representative of a broader trend in Jordan, 
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where total FDI inflows have steadily declined from their high of 25.54% of GDP in 2006 
to just 1.86% by 2019.215  
Another point that highlights the apparent mismatch between words and actions in 
the Sino-Jordanian relationship is the fact that Jordan and China do not have an active 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT). While it is true that a BIT between the two countries was 
signed in 2001, that treaty has never been put into force.216 This is particularly noteworthy 
when one considers the fact that with the exception of Jordan and Iraq, “China has [active] 
bilateral investment treaties in force with every country in the [Middle East].”217 The lack 
of such a document translates to fewer potential pools of Chinese funding for Jordanian 
development, as BITs are key sources of securing FDI for developing nations.218 
In terms of trade and infrastructure, the economic ties between China and Jordan 
are weak. Still, in the context of China’s engagement with other countries in the region, it 
is only logical to assess whether China exerts any observable influence on the Jordan’s 
diplomatic decision-making. 
D. JORDANIAN POLITICAL RESPONSES 
1. United Nations Voting 
The relationship between Jordan’s and China’s voting behaviors on UNGA human 
rights resolutions provides clues as to whether China has influenced Jordan in the 
diplomatic arena. In general, there appears to be alignment between the two countries’ 
votes in specific issues, but this alignment cannot be classified as generalized across the 
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board. As such, this evidence suggests that, in the diplomatic arena, Jordanian support is 
not a component of a Sino-centric constituency. 
With regards to UN votes that address general human rights principles, Jordan has 
voted “Yes” on resolutions sponsored by China 98% of the time. Moreover, every single 
one of these resolutions has been opposed by the United States. In this sense, it is evident 
that a significant degree of overlap exists between Jordan and China with regard to a desire 
by developing and formerly developing countries to affirm specific ideological principles 
(such as a “right to food” and the “promotion of a democratic and equitable international 
order”) that these countries see as being useful. A salient point that must also be considered, 
though, is the fact that, in response to the sixteen American-sponsored resolutions in this 
category, Jordan has voted with the U.S. 100% of the time. This fact is notable, for it 
represents the highest degree of voting alignment between the U.S. and any of the subject 
countries of this thesis. In these terms, China, even when supported by Jordan in its own 
resolutions, has thus far not affected Jordan’s response to U.S.-led initiatives. 
Jordan’s record of voting on resolutions that pertain to the human rights situations 
in specific countries is likewise reflective of a relatively low degree of overlap with China’s 
general positions. Of the four human rights situations that have been consistently voted on 
in the UNGA since 1996 (Myanmar, Iran, Syria, and North Korea), Jordan has voted in a 
fashion that mirrors China’s on only one, which is the situation in Iran. In this series of 
votes, though, it should be noted that Jordan has abstained or not voted 17 of 22 times; its 
number of “No” votes (four) is significantly less than the 22 “No” votes that China has cast 
during voting on the same resolutions. Even though Jordan’s votes regarding this issue do 
not collectively reflect the apparent preference of the U.S. (which voted “Yes” to condemn 
Iran 22 times), its position cannot be seen as being equivalent to China’s. 
Responses to the other aforementioned situations also highlight differences 
between Jordanian and Chinese voting behavior. Of the four resolutions that address the 
situation in Syria, Jordan has voted “Yes” four times, while China has consistently voted 
“No.” The differences in the responses to the resolutions addressing the situations in North 
Korea and Myanmar are even more telling; while Jordan’s votes were evenly split between 
abstentions and “Yes” votes up until 2010, their responses in the years afterward were 
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consecutive “Yes” votes. China, on the other hand, consistently voted “No.” On these 
specific issues that address situations in states that neighbor China, Jordan has increasingly 
moved away from the PRC’s stated positions, rather than following China’s lead. 
Overall, Jordan has voted the same way as China only nine times of the 78 total 
resolutions that address specific human rights situations. While a degree of voting 
similarity does exist, it is apparent in a more general sense that Jordan does not follow 
China’s lead in the UN. When one considers the relatively low levels of Chinese economic 
engagement in Jordan, this is not surprising. 
2. The Uyghur Issue 
The Jordanian response to the Uyghur issue can be characterized as muted, at best. 
The Jordanian government has typically not taken a strong position on China’s treatment 
of its Uyghur minority, with a few of the instances in which the Jordanian government has 
chosen to remain silent and refused to either support or condemn China’s actions being 
more conspicuous than others. Evidence from both past reactions and more recent 
developments suggest that, while the Jordanian leadership cannot be counted on to rebuke 
China’s actions, it also cannot be seen as being outright supportive of the PRC’s handling 
of Xinjiang. 
Jordan is notable in that there have been observable levels of governmental and 
popular sympathy with the plight of Uyghurs. In 2009, forty Jordanian members of 
parliament, as Raphael Israeli notes, “submitted a letter to the speaker of the Jordanian 
Parliament, calling on the government to condemn the events in Xinjiang.”219 In this letter, 
the Islamist party in power requested that the government speak out against “practices 
against Muslims in Germany and China,” although no official government statement 
resulted from this.220 These sentiments extend to more recent times; as recently as 2019, a 
significant protest was staged in front of the Chinese embassy in Amman to forcefully 
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speak out against the situation in Xinjiang.221 These happenings suggest that the Jordanian 
response of China’s actions should not be viewed in terms of monolithic support. 
Perhaps the most notable of Jordan’s actions, however, concerns the response of 
Jordan’s UN delegation to the dueling letters that were submitted to the president of the 
UN Human Rights Council in July 2019. While Jordan did not sign the initial July 8th 
letter, which condemned China’s practices in Xinjiang,222 it also apparently declined the 
opportunity to join the 50 signatories of the second letter, dated July 12th, a document 
which openly condoned China’s actions.223 This point is noteworthy, for Jordan is the only 
majority Arab country in the Middle East whose signature is absent from that document. 
This piece of evidence demonstrates that Jordan is less willing than other Arab states to 
openly support China on this issue. 
Recent developments appear to confirm this dynamic. Chinese state media reported 
that, at the ninth China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in July 2020, China’s foreign 
minister, Wang Yi, thanked the foreign ministers of both Saudi Arabia and Jordan for Arab 
support regarding China’s “core-interest issues” (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang).224 
What is most telling, though, is that there are no mentions of these comments being made 
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specifically to Jordan’s foreign minister, as they apparently had been to the foreign minister 
of Saudi Arabia. Further, there is no record in either Chinese or Jordanian media of the 
Jordanian foreign minister’s response to this praise. The fact that such a significant 
development cannot be independently verified through means other than those sponsored 
by the Chinese government undermines the legitimacy of this claimed source of Arab 
support. 
The lack of open praise for China is notable, especially when juxtaposed against 
the collective support and enthusiasm of other Arab nations on this issue. While this 
evidence does not indicate that Jordan will forcefully speak out against China in the near 
term, it does suggest that Jordanian leaders are less motivated than leaders of the countries 
that have more substantial Chinese economic involvement to speak out in active support 
of China on this issue. 
3. Bilateral Relations with the U.S. 
If the central argument of this thesis holds, then China’s limited involvement is not 
expected to have negatively impacted the bilateral relationship between Jordan and the 
United. Indeed, as the data gathered from Jordanian arms transactions and certain forms of 
diplomatic activity with the U.S. between 1993 and 2019 demonstrate, U.S.-Jordanian ties 
are on anything but downward trends.  
Arms sales show that the relationship between Washington and Amman remains 
relatively strong. In terms of SIPRI-calculated TIVs, the annual value of sales originating 
in the U.S. between 1993 and 2019 have averaged roughly $50 million. This is almost six 
times the value of arms sales between Jordan and China during the same time period. It is 
evident that the U.S. has been and is Jordan’s primary partner; while roughly 17% of 
Jordan’s arms deals during this period came from the U.S, less than 1% was with China. 
Indeed, in both relative and absolute terms, this trend has only strengthened over time (See 
Figure 12).  
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Figure 12. SIPRI TIVs of Official Arms Exports to Jordan, 1993–2019225 
The value of U.S.-Jordan transactions, which averaged roughly $56 million per year 
between 1993 and 2000, grew to more than $150 between 2001 and 2010, and further 
increased to $202 million during the most recent period between 2011 and 2019. Even as 
China’s economic presence in the broader Middle East grows, Jordan continues to 
strengthen its relationship with its primary security partner, the United States. 
The frequency of diplomatic visits has also remained high. According to the United 
States Department of State, the two kings of Jordan during this time period, Hussein and 
Abdullah II, visited the U.S. for working visits with the U.S. president an average of twice 
per year; this trend has remained constant over time.226 Visits by U.S. secretaries of state 
to Jordan have likewise been consistent, with the average number of visits per year standing 
at 1.75, 1.4 and, and 1.77 for the periods of 1993–2000, 2001–2010, and 2011–2019, 
respectively.227 As expected, this evidence suggests that Jordan has taken few, if any, steps 
to minimize its diplomatic relationship with the U.S. 
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As expected in this control case, China’s lack of economic engagement with of 
Jordan is correlated with relatively weak diplomatic ties and a lack of outright support for 
the PRC’s actions in Xinjiang. Additionally, even as China’s influence has grown in the 
Middle East between 1993 and the present day, Jordan has taken few discernible steps to 
weaken its partnership with the United States. In sum, China’s influence has had little effect 
on Jordan’s political actions. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis examined the political and diplomatic ramifications of China’s drive to 
expand its economic footprint in the MENA region. It began with a discussion of the 
significance of this dynamic, primarily as it relates to the increasing significance of great 
power competition in the scholarly and policymaking communities. A review of the related 
academic literature identified foci on, first, the possible motivations for China’s economic 
expansion into the MENA regions, including a desire to alter or transform certain elements 
the contemporary international order; second, the forms of China’s economic activity in 
the region; and, third, the effects of this activity on the political behavior of China’s 
economic partner states. 
In order to answer the research question, I employed a comparative case study 
method, examining three MENA states with differing economic relationships with the 
PRC. The first case was Saudi Arabia, whose economic relationship with China is primarily 
based on the latter’s petroleum demand and energy security concerns. The second case was 
Egypt, whose contemporary relations with China are defined by infrastructure 
development and BRI investment. The third case was Jordan; as a state with relatively 
weak economic ties with China, it served as the control in my analysis. 
For each case, I outlined the forms and extent of China’s economic activities in the 
given country since 1993, the year of China’s emergence as a net energy importer. I then 
analyzed each country’s voting history related to UNGA resolutions concerning human 
rights, governmental perceptions of and responses to the Chinese government’s actions in 
Xinjiang, and relative changes in its strategic and diplomatic partnership with the United 
States during the period between 1993 and the present. 
A. FINDINGS 
Based on the evidence gathered through the aforementioned analyses, this thesis 
finds support for the main hypothesis; that is, that China has been successful in using its 
influence and the forms of economic engagement that undergird it to build political support 
for specific actions (see Table 1). However, these effects are not universal. 
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Table 1. Summary of Findings 
 Increasing alignment 
with China’s voting 
on UNGA human 
rights resolutions 
Favorable response to 




partnership with the 
U.S. 
Saudi Arabia  ¸  
Egypt  ¸ ¸ 
Jordan    
 
An analysis of the selected MENA states’ voting patterns in relation to UNGA 
resolutions that address human rights reveals that there have been no discernible shifts in 
voting behavior to better align with the PRC’s preferences, in any of the three cases. As 
such, this thesis finds little evidence indicating that partner states are bandwagoning with 
China to create constituencies that universally or consistently support the CCP’s positions 
on human rights situations that occur outside of China’s borders. 
This thesis does, however, find strong evidence that China’s economic engagement 
has influenced certain MENA states’ responses to the CCP’s treatment of its Uyghur 
minority in Xinjiang Province. The governments of Arab, majority-Muslim states that have 
had high levels of engagement with China on the basis of the petroleum trade or 
infrastructure development and investment are more likely to display behaviors that align 
with China’s visions of human rights within its borders. Not only do these states proffer 
rhetorical platitudes supporting China’s oppressive actions against another population of 
Sunni Muslims that have thus far posed little threat to the stability of MENA regimes, but 
they also bolster China’s credibility on the international stage, and, in Egypt’s case, 
actively assist China with implementing initiatives ways that contravene human rights 
norms within the liberal international order. This phenomenon stands in stark contrast to 
the relative lack of supporting actions from Jordan, a MENA state with a lighter Chinese 
economic footprint. The variation between the responses of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on 
the one hand, and Jordan, on the other, suggests that economic engagement is linked with 
political responses for this indicator. 
71 
On a broader scale, this evidence indicates that the amplification of domestic factors 
in certain MENA states that contribute toward a more permissive environment for 
authoritarianism, such as the Egyptian regime’s concern with internal stability, serves some 
of China’s key interests. While Beijing has been unable to or uninterested in influencing 
partners to consistently support international initiatives that address human rights situations 
outside of China, it has been effective in building support for a prominent action of its 
regime specifically. 
The third indicator, the trend in each state’s security and political partnership with 
the U.S, provides some evidence that China’s economic engagement is increasing its 
influence in the region. The thesis finds little evidence that either Saudi Arabia or Jordan 
are weakening their reliance on the U.S., the great power that has exerted the most 
significant influence in the MENA region over the past several decades. The Egypt case, 
however, demonstrates that the rising levels of Chinese investments and commitments 
embodied by the BRI are correlated with decreasing arms sales from the U.S. and declining 
frequency of visits between high-level American and Egyptian diplomatic officials. This 
finding suggests that the form of China’s regional engagement may matter. The PRC’s 
involvement with partners states on the basis of the BRI has broader effects on partner 
states’ behavior than engagement based primarily on energy purchases. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
The end of the Cold War and the ensuing unipolar moment were marked by the 
apparent triumph of liberal institutions, the global defense of human rights, and U.S. 
primacy in many areas of the world, including the Middle East. Key aspects of this era, 
however, appear to be changing as other great powers gain influence both inside and 
outside of the institutional framework that defines the contemporary global order. In light 
of these developments, and this thesis’s findings, it would be beneficial to consider the 
following policy recommendations: 
Shift the narrative on American engagement in the Middle East 
Traditionally, the United States’ involvement in the Middle East has occurred 
through the sharper edges of hard power. This is best seen in the enduring military presence 
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that the U.S maintains in the region and the so-called “endless wars”228 that have ensued 
in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The resulting fatigue among the American 
public has reduced the collective will to engage with partners in the region, in any fashion. 
Adding to this fatigue is the United States’ reduced reliance on foreign petroleum 
resources. However, signaling by U.S. officials that either public fatigue or U.S. energy 
independence presages a withdrawal from the Middle East creates conditions in which 
other powers, like China, can fill perceived or actual vacuums of influence. 
While military tools are a critical part of the American policy toolkit, U.S. 
policymakers and scholars should place greater emphasis on regional geoeconomics. As 
China’s BRI demonstrates, governmental leaders in states across the region are enthusiastic 
about securing commitments for the foreign investment that could improve living 
conditions within their borders and potentially create the conditions necessary for regime 
stability. In a similar sense, China’s increasing demand for petroleum resources has 
encouraged oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia to partner with China, as the revenues from 
the PRC are integral to their own economic growth. In both cases, the PRC’s interests 
receive more prominent consideration in the political calculations of these states. A 
renewed focus on U.S. economic engagement in the MENA region, in the forms of both 
facilitating infrastructure development and assisting with the transition away from 
rentierism, would provide the U.S. government with a credible means of countering the 
influence of other great powers.  
Be proactive in defending against human rights abuses 
The responses (or lack thereof) from Arab states with strong economic relationships 
with the PRC to the apparent genocide of Chinese Uyghurs demonstrates that a more active 
approach may be beneficial in addressing human rights issues in international arenas. 
Rather than passively waiting for Arab regimes to respond to the situation in Xinjiang on 
the basis of shared religious and cultural identities in a way that aligns with U.S. interests, 
the U.S. should instead proactively assume leadership on this issue and those like it, 
 
 228 Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History (New 
York: Random House, 2016). 
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influencing others in the multilateral arenas in which it still has sway. The dueling letters 
in the UNHRC that addressed the Uyghur situation were notable not only because of the 
presence of the Arab states who supported China’s actions, but also because of the absence 
of American participation. The low levels of conformity between the voting patterns of 
these same states and China suggest that gaps still exist between the interests and values of 
the PRC and those states that it partners with. It is these gaps that American leaders should 
exploit, using their own tools of economic attraction to promote ideals complementary to 
American interests in the global arena. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis contributed to the body of academic literature that addresses how great 
powers may be using regional influence to achieve outcomes with global significance. 
There are other areas, however, in which this study could be broadened. One area that 
demands further research is the behavior of partner states in other multilateral venues. How 
have states reacted to Chinese-led initiatives in other key bodies of the international order, 
such as the World Health Organization or World Trade Organization? This research could 
also be further expanded to analyze the behavior of other MENA states, as well as those 
states that lay outside the Middle East. It would be instructive to assess how China’s 
economic activities impact relations with a variety of nations, as China’s rise will have 
global effects. 
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